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the next legislature will give careful consideration to the proposed cor-
poration laws, with special emphasis on a remedy for the deadlock
situation.
R. C. VAUGHN, JR.
Labor Law-Fair Labor Standards Act-Coverage of Maintenance
Employees of Office Buildings
Maintenance employees in office buildings present a real problem
under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Their employer is frequently
a corporation whose sole business is that of renting space in local build-
ings, although the employer may be a manufacturing company or a bank
using a part of the building for its own offices and renting the balance.
Where all or part of the building is rented, the tenants may be engaged
in purely local business, or in interstate commerce either on or off the
premises, or in the production of goods for commerce either in the build-.
ing or at another location. The maintenance employees themselves sel-
dom have any direct contact with the carrying on of interstate commerce
or with the physical production of goods for commerce. They clean the
building, operate the elevators, make repairs, guard and heat the prem-
ises, and perform a variety of other activities admittedly essential to
the successful operation of the modern office building. The question
which arises in each case, however, is whether such activities are so
closely related to commerce or production of goods for commerce as
to bring the maintenance employees under the coverage of the Fair
Labor Standards Act.
Coverage under the act is dependent on the activities of the em-
ployee rather than on the business of the employer. Thus the employees
may be under the act even though the employer is a local real estate
firm and therefore clearly not engaged in commerce or in the production
of goods for commerce.' On the other hand, the employees may not
be covered even though their employer is engaged in commerce. 2
Any employee is covered who is engaged in commerce or in the
production of goods for commerce,3 the latter including any closely
related process or occupation directly essential to the production of
goods for commerce. 4 In this connection it is necessary to distinguish
Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U. S. 517 (1942).
Carrigan v. Provident Trust Co., 153 F. 2d 74 (3rd Cir. 1946); Building
Service Employees International Union v. Trenton Trust Co., 142 F. 2d 257
(3rd Cir. 1944).
'52 STAT. 1062, 1063 (1938), 29 U. S. C. §§ 206, 207 (1946), as amended,
63 STAT. 912 (1949), 29 U. S. C. §§ 206, 207 (Supp. 1953). See LIVENGOOD, THE
FEDERAL WAGE AND HOUR LA v (American Law Institute 1952); Tyson, The
Fair Labor Standard Avwndments of 1949, 28 N. C. L. REv. 161 (1950).
'52 STAT. 1060 (1938), 29 U. S. C. § 203(j) (1946), as amended, 63 STAT.
911 (1949), 29 U. S. C. § 203(j) (Supp. 1953).
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between "engaged in commerce" on the one hand and "in the produc-
tion of goods for commerce" on the other.
The courts have narrowly construed the phrase "engaged in com-
merce" and have not extended the act to cover maintenance employees
whose only connection with interstate commerce is that they work in the
same building in which tenants are engaged in commerce.5 Thus in the
recent case of Tobin v. Girard Properties, Inc.6 where the major part
of the building was rented to a telephone company for its executive
offices, the court found that the maintenance employees were not engaged
in commerce. Also, in the early bank cases the courts held that even
though the employer-bank might be engaged in commerce, the work of
the maintenance employees was not closely enough related to bring the
employees under the act.7
The phrase "production of goods for commerce" has been given a
much more liberal meaning. The basis for this distinction is in the
act itself. As to production of goods for commerce, the act specifically
states that it includes not only the employees who are employed in
producing, manufacturing, mining, handling, transporting, or in any
manner working on the goods, but also those employed in any closely
related process or occupation directly essential to the production of
goods,8 or, prior to the 1949 amendment, those necessary to the pro-
duction of such goods. Commerce is defined as trade, commerce, trans-
Tobin v. Girard Properties, Inc., 206 F. 2d 524 (5th Cir. 1953) ; Blumenthal
v. Girard Trust Co., 141 F. 2d 849 (3rd Cir. 1944); Johnson v. Masonic Building
Co., 138 F. 2d 817 (5th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U. S. 780 (1943) ; Rucker v.
First National Bank of Miami, 138 F. 2d 699 (10th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321
U. S. 769 (1943); Rosenberg v. Semeria, 137 F. 2d 742 (9th Cir. 1943), cerl.
denied, 320 U. S. 770 (1943); Johnson v. Dallas Downtown Development Co.,
132 F. 2d 287 (5th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 790 (1942) ; Wideman v.
Blanchard & Calhoun Realty Co., 50 F. Supp. 626 (S. D. Ga. 1943); Hinkler v.
Eighty-Three Maiden Lane Corp., 50 F. Supp. 263 (S. D. N. Y. 1943); In re
New York Title & Mortgage Co., 179 Misc. 789, 39 N. Y. S. 2d 893 (Sup. Ct.
1943); Greene v. Anchor Mills Co., 224 N. C. 714, 32 S. E. 2d 341 (1944),
cert denied, 324 U. S. 880 (1945); Robinson v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 158 S. W. 2d 441 (Tenn. 1941).
6 Tobin v. Girard Properties, Inc., 206 F. 2d 524 (5th Cir. 1953).
Building Service Employees International Union v. Trenton Trust Co., 142
F. 2d 257 (3rd Cir. 1944); Convey v. Omaha National Bank, 140 F. 2d 640
(8th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U. S. 781 (1944) ; Rucker v. First National
Bank of Miami, 138 F. 2d 699 (10th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U. S. 769
(1943); Lofther v. First National Bank of Chicago, 138 F. 2d 299 (7th Cir.
1943); Brandell v. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co., 43 F. Supp.
781 (N. D. Il. 1941); Fultz v. United States Trust Co., 302 Ky. 493, 195 S. W.
2d 87 (1946); Stoike v. First National Bank, 290 N. Y. 195, 48 N. E. 2d 482
(1943), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 762 (1943) ; Connelly v. Hamilton National Bank,
182 Tenn. 77, 184 S. W. 2d 173 (1944). But cf. Walling v. Bank of Wanesboro,
61 F. Supp. 384 (S. D. Ga. 1945) where janitor also served as messenger for
the bank and was considered as engaged in interstate commerce.
152 STAT. 1060 (1938), 29 U. S. C. § 203(j) (1946), as amended, 63 STAT,
911 (1949), 29 U. S. C. § 203(j) (Supp. 1953).
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portation, transmission, or communication 9 and no specific extension is
made to occupations or processes directly essential thereto.
An interesting illustration of the difference in construction of the
two phrases is afforded by the bank cases. Those cases in which the
sole issue was whether the employees were engaged in commerce held
that although the bank was engaged in commerce, the maintenance
employees were not closely enough related to be brought under the
act.' 0 In the later cases, however, where it was found that the bank
was engaged in the production of goods for commerce, maintenance
employees were found to be covered by the act.'
Maintenance employees are almost never found to be actually pro-
ducing or physically handling the goods being produced for commerce.
The question is almost always one of whether they are engaged in
activities "necessary to" or since 1949, "directly essential to" production
of goods for commerce. In order to determine this, it is necessary to
look not only at the activities of the employee but also at the activities
of the employer and of the tenant, where these activities are performed,
the number and nature of intervening processes between the activity and
the actual physical production, and the characteristics and purposes of
the employer's business. 12
The cases involving maintenance employees allegedly engaged in
the production of goods for commerce fall into three groups:
(1) Where a substantial part of the building is rented to tenants who
are engaged in the production of goods for commerce in the building it-
self, the maintenance employees are covered, even though the employer
is a local real estate firm. This was established by the U. S. Supreme
Court in Kirschbaum v. Walling in 1942,13 and has been applied in
numerous cases since.14 Even though the employees do not handle the
0 Ibid, § 203(b).
10 See note 7 supra.
"Union National Bank of Little Rock v. Durkin, 207 F. 2d 848 (8th Cir.
1953); Bozant v. Bank of New York, 156 F. 2d 787 (2d Cir. 1946).
"529 CODE FED. REGS. § 776.17(c) (1950).
13316 U. S. 517 (1942).14D. A. Schulte v. Gangi, 328 U. S. 108 (1946); Brooklyn Say. Bank v.
O'Neil, 324 U. S. 697 (1945); Grant v. Bergdorf & Goodman Co., 172 F. 2d
109 (2d Cir. 1949); Roberg v. Henry Phipps Estate, 156 F. 2d 958 (2d Cir.
1946); Baldwin v. Emigrant Industrial Trust Say. Bank, 150 F. 2d 524 (2d
Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U. S. 767 (1945) ; Fleming v. Post, 146 F. 2d 441
(2d Cir. 1944); Merryfield v. F. M. Hoyt Shoe Corp., 128 F. 2d 452 (1st Cir.
1942); Asselta v. 149 Madison Avenue Corp., 65 F. Supp. 385 (S. D. N. Y.
1945); Frank v. McMeekan, 56 F. Supp. 369 (E. D. N. Y. 1944); Bittner v.
Chicago Daily News Printing Co., 4 W. H. Cases (BNA) 837 (N. D. Il. 1944);
Berry v. 34 Irving Place Corp., 52 F. Supp. 875 (S. D. N. Y. 1943) ; Spaeth v.
Washington University, 213 S. W. 2d 276 (Mo. 1948) ; Quest v. George A. Bow-
man, Inc., 64 N. Y. S. 2d 60 (N. Y. City Ct. 1946) ; Rienzo v. City Bank Farmers
Trust Co., 183 Misc. 153, 53 N. Y. S. 2d 68 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Schineck v. 386
Fourth Ave. Corp., 182 Misc. 1037, 49 N. Y. S. 2d 872 (N. Y. City Ct. 1944);
Floyd v. 58-64 Fortieth Street Corp., 44 N. Y. S. 2d 422 (N. Y. City Ct. 1943).
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goods produced, their maintenance work is considered to have such a
close and immediate tie with the process of production that they are
considered to be engaged in an occupation necessary to the production
of goods for commerce. Although the Kirschbaum case was decided
before the 1949 amendment which changed "necessary to" to "directly
essential to" legislative history' 5 and administrative statements'0 have
indicated that no change was intended by this amendment. In the
recent decision of Union National Bank of Little Rock v. Durkin'7 the'
8th Circuit expressly followed the Kirschbaum case and indicated that
the 1949 amendment had made no change. The Union National Bank
case, however, was a stronger case for coverage since the employer him-
self was found to be engaged in the production of goods for commerce
in the building whereas in the Kirschbaum case it was the tenants who
were producing the goods.
(2) Where the building is owned by a business which is engaged
in the production of goods for commerce and is used at least in part
for its executive offices, the maintenance employees are covered by the
act. Thus in Borden v. Borella,'8 although there was no physical pro-
duction of goods in the office building itself, the court felt that since
the employer-owner was himself engaged in the production of goods
for commerce at another location and used this building for directing
and controlling that production, the maintenance employees were en-
gaged in an occupation necessary to such production. These employees,
the court pointed out, would have been covered had the offices been
in the same building with the manufacturing establishment. The office,
even though at another location, was a part of an integrated effort for
the production of goods and to'make a distinction based on the mere
fact that the office was physically separated from the plant was econom-
ically unjustifiable.
This case was followed and in fact extended by the recent case of
General Electric v. Porter" where the 9th Circuit held the act covered
firemen employed by General Electric in a company-owned town in
which the executive offices of the plant were located although the plant
which was producing goods for commerce was several miles away.
Whether the Supreme Court will uphold such an extension in the light
of the 1949 amendments remains to be seen.
(3) In those buildings in which there is no substantial production
of goods for commerce in the building but in which there are tenants,
H. R. RP.. No. 1453, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 2253 (1949).
"'Adm. Statement (Dec. 8, 1953), WAGE & HOUR MANUAL (BNA) 10:295
(1953).
.7207 F. 2d 848 (8th Cir. 1953).
s 325 U. S. 679 (1945).
19 208 F. 2d 805 (9th Cir. 1953).
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as distinguished from the owner, who are engaged in the production of
goods for commerce at another location, the maintenance employees
are not covered. In Ten East 40th Street Bldg., Inc. v. Callus2° the
U. S. Supreme Court by a five to four decision held that the employees
were too far removed from the actual production of goods for com-
merce to be included even within that phrase "necessary to the pro-
duction." Renting office space in a building devoted to an unrestricted
variety of office work, said the majority of the court, spontaneously
satisfied common understanding of what is local business and made
the employees of such a building engaged in local business. The dis-
sent felt that the connection with the production of goods here was
as close as that in the Borden case which was decided on the same day,
that coverage depended on the work of the employees which in the two
cases was the same, and that the mere chance of whether the employee
was employed by the producer of the goods or by the independent
owner of the building should make no difference.
As the 1949 amendment was intended to restrict the coverage of
the act and these employees were excluded even before that amend-
ment, the amendment cannot, of course, further restrict coverage in
these cases.
Since whether maintenance employees in these cases are covered
by the act depends on the production of goods for commerce either
by the owner or the tenants, it is necessary to examine just what activi-
ties are considered by the courts to be production.
The act defines "produced" as "produced, manufactured, mined,
handled, or in any other manner worked on," 2' and "goods" as "goods,
wares, products, commodities, merchandise, or subjects of commerce
of any character, or any part or ingredient thereof. '22  The actual
manufacture of such tangible items as women's clothes, watches, or
jewelry is, of course, clearly production of goods.23 "Produced," how-
ever, has also been held to cover the process of issuing insurance
policies, 24 mimeographing news bulletins,25 preparing advertising plates
2 325 U. S. 578 (1945).
2152 STAT. 1060 (1938), 29 U. S. C. § 203(j) (1946), as amended, 63 STAT.
911 (1949), 29 U. S. C. § 203(j) (Supp. 1953).
Ibid. § 203(i) ; 29 CODE FED. R.Gs. § 776.20 (1950).
"D. A. Schulte v. Gangi, 328 U. S. 108 (1946) ; Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316
U. S. 517 (1942) ; Roberg v. Henry Phipps Estate, 156 F. Zd 958 (2d Cir. 1946).
" Union National Bank of Little Rock v. Durkin, 207 F. 2d 848 (8th Cir. 1953)(branch office); Darr v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169 F. 2d 262 (2d Cir. 1948),
cert. denied, 335 U. S. 871 (1948). Contra: Hinkler v. Eighty-Three Maiden
Lane Corp., 50 F. Supp. 263 (S. D. N. Y. 1943).
" Ullo v. Smith, 177 F. 2d 101 (2d Cir. 1949) ; Baldwin v. Emigrant Indus-
trial Trust Say. Bank, 150 F. 2d 524 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U. S. 767
(1945); Berry v. 34 Irving Place Corp., 52 F. Supp. 875 (S. D. N. Y. 1943).
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and copy, 26 editing and proofreading scripts for books and motion pic-
tures,2 7 and publishing a newspaper.28 The more recent cases have
held that banks by issuing or authenticating bonds, stocks, notes, or
drafts are engaged in the production of goods for commerce.29  Lawyers
or brokers, however, are not producing goods merely because they
draw deeds or write letters that are sent through the mails into another
state.30
Production of goods also includes handling. Repacking and re-
labeling goods have been held to be production,8 ' as have receiving and
shipping them.3 2  Other cases have held that repacking or shipping by
a jobber who did not manufacture the goods is not production.8 3
A tenant may be producing goods for commerce even though he
sell to local concerns. It is enough if he knows or has reason to know
that his products are to be shipped in interstate commerce.3 4
The amount of production for commerce in the building must be
substantial for the maintenance employees to be covered by the act. The
statute gives no definition of "substantial," but the administrator and
most of the courts adopted 20 per cent as a rough guide; that is, where
the tenants producing goods for commerce occupied more than 20 per
cent of the floor space, the maintenance employees were covered,3 5 and
2 Asselta v. 149 Madison Avenue Corp., 65 F. Supp. 385 (S. D. N. Y. 1945) ;
Schineck v. 386 Fourth Ave. Corp., 182 Misc. 1037, 49 N. Y. S. 2d 872 (N. Y.
City Ct. 1944).
217 Roberg v. Henry Phipps Estate, 156 F. 2d 958 (2d Cir. 1946) ; Baldwin v.
Emigrant Industrial Trust Say. Bank, 150 F. 2d 524 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied,
326 U. S. 767 (1945).
"Bittner v. Chicago Daily News Printing Co., 4 W. H. Cases (BNA) 837
(N. D. I1. 1944).
" Union National Bank of Little Rock v. Durkin, 207 F. 2d 848 (8th Cir.
1953) ; Bozant v. Bank of New York, 156 F. 2d 787 (2d Cir. 1946). But cf.:
Holmes v. Elizabeth Trust Co., 72 F. Supp. 182 (D. N. J. 1947).
'°Bozant v. Bank of New York, 156 F. 2d 787 (2d Cir. 1946); Wideman v.
Blanchard & Calhoun Realty Co., 50 F. Supp. 626 (S. D. Ga. 1943).
"Ullo v. Smith, 177 F. 2d 101 (2d Cir. 1949); Roberg v. Henry Phipps
Estate, 156 F. 2d 958 (2d Cir. 1946); Baldwin v. Emigrant Industrial Trust
Say. Bank, 150 F. 2d 524 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U. S. 767 (1945);
Spaeth v. Washington University, 213 S. W. 2d 276 (Mo. 1948); Schineck v.
386 Fourth Ave. Corp., 182 Misc. 1037, 49 N. Y. S. 2d 872 (N. Y. City Ct. 1944).32 Fleming v. Post, 146 F. 2d 441 (2d Cir. 1944) ; Holmes v. Elizabeth TrustCo., 72 F. Supp. 182 (D. N. J. 1947).
"22Ullo v. Smith, 177 F. 2d 101 (2d Cir. 1949); Blumenthal v. Girard Trust
Co., 141 F. 2d 849 (2d Cir. 1944) ; Prescott v. Broadway & Franklin Street Corp.,
57 F. Supp. 272 (S. D. N. Y. 1944); Burke v. Hide & Leather Realty Co., 182
Misc. 319, 48 N. Y. S. 2d 594 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
" 328 U. S. 108 (1946).
B 5 Roberg v. Henry Phipps Estate, 156 F. 2d 958 (2d Cir. 1946) (48%);
Baldwin v. Emigrant Industrial Trust Say. Bank, 150 F. 2d 524 (2d Cir. 1945),
cert. denied, 326 U. S. 767 (1945) (39%) ; Fleming v. Post, 146 F. 2d 444 (2d
Cir. 1944) (25%); Frank v. McMeekan, 56 F. Supp. 369 (E. D. N. Y. 1944)
(76%); Bittner v. Chicago Daily News Printing Co., 4 W. H. Cases (BNA)
837 (N. D. Ill. 1944) (46%) ; Asselta v. 149 Madison Avenue Corp., 65 F. Supp.
385 (S. D. N. Y. 1945) (24%); Quest v. George A. Bowman, Inc., 64 N. Y. S.
2d 60 (N. Y. City Ct. 1946) (more than 20%); Schineck v. 386 Fourth Ave.
Corp., 182 Misc. 1037, 49 N. Y. S. 2d 872 (N. Y. City Ct. 1944) (50%).
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where such tenants occupied less than 20 per cent, maintenance em-
ployees were not covered.3 6 Other courts said little or nothing about
percentages.37  Under the new 1953 Administrative Statement, the
20 per cent rule has been retained for buildings where tenants are
"manufacturing" on the premises.
38
A tenant either is or is not engaged in the production of goods for
commerce; that is, either all or none of his floor space is counted. In
determining whether any single tenant is producing goods for com-
merce, the trial courts have considered the percentage of space, the
percentage of employees actually engaged on the premises in physical
production of goods, and the relation of production for interstate com-
merce to the total production.
39
Some courts have interpreted the 20 per cent rule as applying to
this determination of whether the tenant is engaged in commerce.
40
Other courts have held that it is not necessary to have 20 per cent,
41
the 2nd Circuit court holding in one case that 2 per cent of the income
of one tenant and 5 per cent of the floor space of another were sufficient
to classify these tenants as engaged in the production of goods for
commerce. 42  Thus if 20 per cent of the total floor space of the building
is being occupied by firms producing goods for commerce but each of
those firms is devoting only 5 percent of its own floor space to that
production it would be possible for the maintenance employees to be
covered even though only 1 per cent of the total floor space in the build-
ing were actually devoted to production.
Where a building owned by a producer of goods for commerce is
occupied as its executive offices, the courts have simply indicated that
if maintenance employees are to be covered by the act the building must
be "predominantly" occupied for its offices. 43 In the Borden case this
requirement was met where 58 per cent of the area was so used, al-
t*Ullo v. Smith, 177 F. 2d 101 (2d Cir. 1949) (15%); Hunter v. Madison
Avenue Corp., 174 F. 2d 164 (6th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U. S. 836 (1949)
(3%); Johnson v. Great National Life Insurance Co., 166 S. W. 2d 935 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1942) (8%); In re New York Title & Mortgage Co., 179 Misc. 789,
39 N. Y. S. 2d 893 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (10%).
'7 Berry v. 34 Irving Place Corp., 52 F. Supp. 875 (S. D. N. Y. 1943) ; Hinkle
v. Frank Nelson Bldg. Inc., 245 Ala. 679, 18 So. 2d 374 (1944); Baum v. A. C.
Office Bldg. Co., 157 Kan. 558, 143 P. 2d 417 (1943); Spaeth v. Washington
University, 213 S. W. 2d 276 (Mo. 1948).
"
8Adm. Statement (Dec. 8, 1953) WAGE & HOUR MANUAL (BNA) 10: 295
(1953).
" Ullo v. Smith, 177 F. 2d 101 (2d Cir. 1949); Roberg v. Henry Phipps
Estate, 156 F. 2d 958 (2d Cir. 1946) ; Berry v. 34 Irving Place Corp., 52 F. Supp.
875 (S. D. N. Y. 1943).
, Fleming v. Post, 146 F. 2d 441 (2d Cir. 1944) ; Asselta v. 149 Madison Ave.
Corp., 65 F. Supp. 385 (S. D. N. Y. 1945).
"'Ullo v. Smith, 177 F. 2d 101 (2d Cir. 1949); Roberg v. Henry Phipps
Estate, 156 F. 2d 958 (2d Cir. 1946).
"' Roberg v. Henry Phipps Estate, 156 F. 2d 958 (2d Cir. 1946).
"'Borden Co. v. Borella, 325 U. S. 679 (1945).
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though there was no discussion as to what percentage would be con-
sidered "predominantly" occupied.
Where a bank occupies part of the building, the courts have indi-
cated that the maintenance employees will be covered if the proportion
of goods produced is enough to "color the activities of the employees
as a whole." 44  Here again the courts have not interpreted "enough
to color" but have held 50 per cent in one case" and 80 per cent in
another sufficient.4 6  The new administrative rulings on the latter two
points are not wholly clear.4
7
Until 1949, coverage of the act had gradually spread to include
more and more maintenance employees. The Kirschbaum case in 1942
extended it to maintenance employees of independent real estate com-
panies if the tenants were engaged in the production of goods for
commerce. The Borden case in 1945 brought within the coverage of
the act maintenance employees in office buildings owned by producers
of goods for interstate commerce and used by them for their executive
offices. The Martino case" in 1946 extended coverage to employees
of a local window washing firm who worked only temporarily on the
premises of a plant producing goods for interstate commerce. The
Gangi case49 in the same year made it clear that employees in buildings
where the tenants produced goods which were not sold directly in inter-
state commerce but which the tenant had reason to believe would go
into interstate commerce were within the act.
Extension took place also in another form. More and more types
of activities were considered by the courts as production of goods for
commerce. Banking activities, for example, which at first were assumed
to be merely interstate commerce were later held to be production of
goods for commerce. In the later cases, too, there is a great deal more
judicial investigation into the activities of the tenants.
The 1949 amendment by changing "necessary" to "directly essential"
was intended to restrict coverage under the act. The House Conference
Report 5° indicated, however, that the changes were not intended to
remove from the act the maintenance employees of manufacturers and
other producers of goods for commerce and that employees engaged in
such maintenance work would remain subject to the act even though
"Bozant v. Bank of New York, 156 F. 2d 787 (2d Cir. 1946).
45 Ibid.
"8 Union National Bank of Little Rock v. Durkin, 207 F. 2d 848 (8th Cir.
1953).
*1 'Adm. Statement (Dec. 8, 1953) WAGE & HOUR MANUAL (BNA) 10: 295(1953).8 artino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Co., 327 U. S. 173 (1946).
"D. A. Schulte v. Gangi, 328 U. S. 108 (1946).
C I "H. R. REP. No. 1453, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 2253 (1949); Sanders, Basic
Coverage of the Amended Federal Wage and Hour Law, 3 VAND. L. R. 175(1950).
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they were employed by an independent employer. Such activities were
closely related and directly essential to the production of goods for
commerce. Maintenance employees like those in the Martino case,
however, were to be removed from the act.
The first Interpretative Bulletin issued after the 1949 amendment
was in such general terms that it threw little light on the policies to
be followed with regard to maintenance employeesY1 A more detailed
administrative policy was announced in a statement dated December
8, 1953.r2 The statement expressly excluded consideration of mainte-
nance employees of manufacturers, processors, mining companies, banks,
or insurance companies engaged in producing goods for interstate com-
merce since, according to the statement, it is well established that they
are covered by the act.
The statement indicates that:
Employees of office buildings housing the usual miscellany of of-
fices, including doctors, dentists, lawyers, etc., and also various small
enterprises such as local watch repair, branch telegraph offices, etc.,
as well as executive and sales offices of manufacturing and mining com-
panies where these offices are a part of the general miscellany are not
considered covered by the act. This is apparently the situation that
existed in the Callus case and represents no change.
Employees of loft buildings occupied exclusively by tenants engaged
on the premises in manufacturing goods for interstate commerce are
considered covered by the act. This is the strongest type of Kirsch-
baum case.
Employees of buildings occupied partly by producers and partly by
offices will be covered or not depending on the percentage of certain
activities in the buildings. If 20 per cent or more of the rentable area
is used by tenants engaged on the premises in the manufacture of goods
for commerce, the maintenance employees of the building will be cov-
ered by the act. This is the usual Kirschbaum situation with the same
20 per cent rule previously used.
If 50 per cent or more of the rentable area of the building is occupied
by the executive offices of a manufacturer or mining company, the
maintenance employees of the building will be covered. This state-
ment in its ambiguity raises several questions. Does this 50 per cent
policy apply only to buildings where the manufacturer owns the build-
ing but occupies only part of its as its executive offices, as in the Borden
case where the manufacturer occupied 58 per cent of the floor space but
the court in holding the employees under the act made no point of the
5129 CoDE FED. REs. §§ 776.0-776.21.
"
2Adm. Statement (Dec. 8, 1953) WAGE: & HouR MANUAL (BNA) 10:295
(1953).
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percentage involved? Or does it apply only to buildings owned by an
independent real estate firm and occupied by a manufacturer for its
executive offices, as in the Callus case where 26 per cent of the building
was used for executive offices but the majority of the court in denying
coverage did not base its decision on the percentage of the space so
used? Or is the administrator announcing that ownership of the build-
ing is immaterial and that he views the distinction between the Borden
and the Callus case as one of percentages and not one of ownership of
the building? In the light of the language of the statement it would
appear that the administrator is saying that if 50 per cent of the build-
ing is rented by a tenant for executive offices from which he controls
his manufacturing of goods for commerce, then those offices are not
a part of the "usual miscellany" and thus are not within the rule of
the Callus case.
If 50 per cent or more of the rentable'area is occupied by a bank or
insurance company, the maintenance employees will be covered. This
raises the same question, that is, whether this applies to situations where
the bank or insurance company owns the building or to situations where
an independent real estate company owns the building or to both situa-
tions.
Of the three Circuit court cases decided since the 1949 amendment,
no restriction of coverage has been indicated. The Girard case in deny-
ing coverage to employees in a building the major part of which had
been rented for offices by a company engaged in commerce simply
followed the earlier cases denying coverage because there was not a
sufficiently close connection with interstate commerce. That part of
the statute relating to "engaged in commerce" was not changed by the
amendment. The Union National Bank case in holding the maintenance
employees covered by the act relied on the Kirschbaum case and indi-
cated that no change was intended by the amendment. The case, how-
ever, was a stronger one for coverage than the Kirschbaum case because
the employer was himself engaged in the production of goods for inter-
state commerce. The General Electric case extended rather than re-
stricted the doctrine of the Borden case. None of these cases, however,
has been passed upon by the Supreme Court. The only district court
case pointing toward a possible restriction held that the act did not
cover a watchman employed to guard the outside of buildings rented to
tenants producing goods for commerce.r3 No cases, of course, have
reached the courts since the announcement of the 1953 Administrative
Statement.
judging from the limited number of court decisions and from the
"Tobin v. Famous Realty, Inc., 111 F. Supp. 659 (E. D. N. Y. 1953).
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administrative interpretations it would appear that little restriction
of coverage of maintenance employees was effected by the 1949 amend-
ment. The real effect of the amendment will not be known definitely
until some case in these borderline areas reaches the Supreme Court.
Until then it is probable that coverage under the act will not only be
materially restricted but that it will continue to be extended in spite of
the amendment.
JEANNE OWEN
Sales-Warranties-Implied in Sale of Food for Human Consumption
In the recent case of Draughon v. Maddox1 the North Carolina
Supreme Court held that in the sale of a cow at auction on a public
market to a retail dealer there was an implied warranty that it was
fit for human consumption. The court relied on two earlier North
Carolina cases in which it was held (1) that there was an implied
warranty that the article sold was suitable for the purpose intended2
and (2) that there was an implied warranty in the sale of food for
human consumption that it was wholesome and fit for that purpose.8
Relying on the statute requiring a health certificate with a cow if not
sold for immediate slaughter,4 the court found that this cow, sold with-
out a health certificate, must have been intended for immediate slaugh-
ter and therefore for human consumption.
The North Carolina cases on implied warranty of fitness for the
purpose intended are not wholly consistent. In the early case of Dick-
son v. Jordan5 the court had held that there was no implied warranty
of quality even where the seller knew the purpose for which the article
was to be used, basing the decision on the fact that since the same price
was paid by the one who did not reveal'his purpose as by the one who
did, there was no consideration to support a warranty of fitness.
Some doubt must have been cast on this rule by the decision in
Thomas v. Simpson0 where the seller who contracted to furnish shingles
was denied recovery because they were not fit for the purpose intended.
The court did not mention the earlier case. Then in a dictum in a
much later case, the court again said that if there was a sale for a
particular purpose, the seller warranted the article to be fit for that
purpose.7
One year after that dictum, however, there was a 'direct holding
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